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Abstract
When agents are not price takers, they typically cannot obtain an eﬃcient
reallocation of resources in one round of trade. This paper presents a non-
cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade alloca-
tions, consistent with the Edgeworth’s idea of recontracting. We show that
there are allocations on the Pareto frontier that can be approximated arbitrar-
ily closely when trade is myopic, i.e., when agents play a static Nash equilib-
rium at every round of retrading. We then show that the converging sequence
of allocations generated by myopic retrading can also be supported along some
retrade-proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium path when traders anticipate future
rounds of retrading.
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trade Proofness.
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In Edgeworth (1881), we ﬁnd the following deﬁnition: “A ﬁnal settlement is a set-
tlement which cannot be varied by recontract within the ﬁeld of competition”. In
this deﬁnition of a ﬁnal settlement, the emphasis is on outcomes that are immune
to recontracting. When individuals interact cooperatively, outcomes immune to re-
contracting are deﬁned to lie in the core of an exchange economy (Debreu and Scarf
(1963)). In contrast, our emphasis is on a non-cooperative formulation of recontract-
ing in a general equilibrium model characterized by imperfect competition. When
the outcomes of trade are ineﬃcient, traders must be allowed to reopen markets.
The allocations from the previous round of trade are the initial endowments in any
new round of trade, while the rules of exchange remain constant. This generates
an iterative process of retrading in which traders are able to reopen markets before
they consume. We focus on the issue of whether retrading will allow traders to
approximate allocations on the Pareto frontier.
The non-cooperative game of exchange we use is the Shapley-Shubik (1977)
market game, where the rules of exchange allow all traders to inﬂuence prices by
sending quantity signals. With a ﬁnite number of traders, Dubey and Rogawski
(1990) have shown, under some mild regularity assumptions on preferences, that
the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the market game are Pareto optimal if and only if
the initial endowments of traders are Pareto optimal as well. This result allows us to
study the incentives traders have to reopen markets before they consume their ﬁnal
allocations even in trading environments characterized by complete information.
In our model, traders can reopen markets a ﬁnite or inﬁnite number of times
before they consume. We think of the number of times traders can reopen markets
as away of capturing the frequency with which they can retrade. At each round
of trade all commodities are exchanged at trading posts except for the numeraire
commodity, in which bids for all other commodities have to be made. For each non-
numeraire commodity, traders can submit bids for the commodity and make oﬀers
of a quantity of the commodity, at the relevant trading post. In any new round of
trade, the endowments of individuals are their ﬁnal allocations from the previous
round of trade. Using these endowments, individuals now make bids and oﬀers in
1the trading posts and obtain allocations determined by the same price formation
rule and allocation rule. The cost of reopening trading posts in any new round of
trade is measured by a common discount factor for all traders.
We study the outcomes of myopic retrading as well as far-sighted retrading.
A path of myopic retrading only requires that each period allocation be a Nash
equilibrium outcome given the ﬁnal allocation of the previous period. With far-
sighted retrading, traders anticipate that there will be retrading in future time-
periods.
With myopic retrading, we show that there are allocations on the Pareto fron-
tier that can be approximated arbitrarily closely along some equilibrium path of
retrading, as the discount factor is close enough to perfect patience and the number
of allowable retrading periods is large enough. We construct an example in which
there is a unique path of myopic retrading, which approximates the Pareto frontier.
The same sequence of allocations that approximates a Pareto optimal allocation
under myopic retrading can be sustained by a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium proﬁle
under far-sighted retrading. The approximation result with far sighted retrading
is shown under two diﬀerent information scenarios. In the ﬁrst, each trader uses
anonymous strategies where current bids and oﬀers are conditioned only on the al-
location obtained from the preceeding round of trade and on the aggergate bids and
oﬀers in the preceeding round of trade. With this restriction, deviations from the
equilibrium path of play are punished by no trade. This is unsatisfactory as now
(oﬀ the equilibrium path of play) traders may have an incentive to reopen trading
posts. We, then show that when strategies are required to be retrade proof, both on
and oﬀ the equilibrium path of play, if all traders are able to observe the identity of
the deviating trader, the approximation result still holds.
However, we also show that, along any equilibrium path of ﬁnite retrading, with
or without far-sighted behavior, no allocation on the Pareto frontier can be attained
even when the cost of reopening trading posts is negligible.
We are also able to demonstrate that any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that
sustains a sequence of allocations that converges to some allocation on the Pareto
frontier must have the property that it must look increasingly similar to the sequence
2of allocations generated by myopic retrading. Moreover, the set of allocations sup-
ported by Subgame Perfect Equilibrium proﬁles is shown to expand as the cost of
reopening trading posts falls. This weak monotonicity result holds with ﬁnite as
well as inﬁnite horizon.
All the results just described are ﬁrst proved under the simplifying assumption
that traders can consume commodities (all tradeable) only after having stopped
trading. However, we show that all results extend to the more general class of
games where traders can decide to consume part of their current endowment at any
time, while remaining on the market with the rest.
Our model of retrading can also be derived as reduced form of a model where the
tradeable goods are actually assets. The goods that agents consume can be simply
viewed as derived from the ﬂow yields of the currently owned stock of assets. With
this interpretation in mind, our model of retrading can be thought of as providing a
rationale for resale markets where assets (more generally, durable goods) are traded.
Moreover, in this case the issue of consumption becomes irrelevant, since the assets
owned by each individual at any given time cannot be consumed, they can only be
kept or traded.
Finally, although we focus on the possibility of eventually reaching an eﬃcient
allocation of resources (or assets) through retrading, we point out that a new type of
market failure also arises in market games with retrading: there are “bad” Subgame
Perfect Equilibria where traders delay trade only because the other traders do the
same.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection compares
our retrading model and our results with the related literature. The next section
p r e s e n t st h ee c o n o m ya n dt h eb a s i cm o d e l so fn o n - c o o p e r a t i v et r a d et h a tw es t u d y .
Section 3 gives a simple example, in which the unique equilibrium path of retrading
converges to the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes the equilibria of
the benchmark retrading model with myopic players. Section 5 characterizes the
Subgame Perfect Equilibria and retrade-proof equilibria of the market game with
far-sighted retrading. Section 6 contains the extensions to the case where each
trader can always choose between consuming and trading any subset of her own
3c o m m o d i t i e sa n dt ot h ec a s ew h e r et h et r a d e a b l eg o o d sa r ea s s e t s . S o m em o r e
technical material is relegated to the appendix.
1.1 Related literature
The model we study as well as the results we obtain are diﬀerent from the body of
related work that studies dynamic noncooperative games of exchange.
Gale (1986a, 1986b, 1987) and McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991)l o o ka ta
model where traders are repeatedly pair-wise matched and bargain over the trades
that they make with each other. With a continuum of traders, complete information,
and endogenous replacement, there is a stationary equilibrium which converges to
the competitive equilibrium as the discount factor converges to one. The following
are the main diﬀerences from our model: (1)W eh a v eaﬁnite number of traders; (2)
Gale’s traders make direct transfers to each other in pairs, which are independent of
the transfers made within other matched pairs at each round of trade (in contrast, in
our model, trade is anonymous and each commodity is traded at a common price);
(3) Once a pair agree to trade, they exit and are replaced by identical copies. In this
sense, in contrast to our model, the same set of traders never really agree to retrade
with each other along the equilibrium path of play. In that framework, retrading
refers to the fact that any type has a positive probability of being repeatedly matched
with any given other type of trader. Moreover, in order to obtain convergence to
eﬃcient allocations, Gale needs traders to be far-sighted. In contrast, we are able
to obtain convergence when traders are myopic.
Dubey, Sahi and Shubik (1993) is closer to our paper, as they also study retrad-
ing in market games. However, they have a model with a continuum of agents.1
Moreover, They do not allow for discounting of future consumption. They show
that if equilibria in the one-shot market game fail to coincide with competitive equi-
libria due to the endowment constraints in the numeraire commodity binding for
non-negligible subsets of traders, competitive equilibria can nevertheless be approx-
1A model of retrading with a continuum of agents corresponds to Edgeworth’s notion of recon-
tracting in a ﬁeld of perfect competition. In contrast, our model studies recontracting in a ﬁeld of
imperfect competition.
4imated arbitrarily when traders are allowed to reopen trading posts before they
consume their ﬁnal allocations. In our model, with a ﬁnite number of agents, the
Nash equilibria of the market game are Pareto ineﬃcient even when endowment
constraints in the numeraire commodity don’t bind for any individual trader.
The process of myopic retrading that we study in Section 4 shares with the
iterative processes studied by Dreze and de la Vallee Poussin (1971), Malinvaud
(1972) and Allen, Dutta and Polemarchakis (1999), the property that reallocations
can be Pareto improving at each step.
Peck and Shell (1990)2 study a model of a market game where traders can make
arbitrarily large short sales, so that net trades are small relative to gross trades.
Using this model they show that, at equilibrium, no individual action has a big eﬀect
on market prices, and therefore equilibrium allocations approximate competitive
equilibrium allocations. Introducing the possibility of arbitrarily large short sales
requires traders in their model to satisfy a budget constraint. They postulate some
form of outside enforcement of the budget constraint via a bankruptcy rule. With
these features, allowing for short sales has similar eﬀects on imperfect competition
as allowing for retrading (as they point out in footnote 6).
2 The Economy
We study trade in pure exchange economies with a ﬁnite set of commodities L
(indexed by l), a ﬁnite set of individuals I (indexed by i). Each individual’s con-
sumption set is <L
+, and his endowment is denoted by wi ∈ <L
++. The utility
function is ui : <L
+ → <. A pure exchange economy is E = {L,(ui,w i):i ∈ I}.A n
allocation x =( x1,...,xI) such that xi ∈ <L






wi. A feasible allocation x is Pareto optimal if there is no other feasible
allocation y such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi)f o ra l li ∈ I with ui(yi) >u i(xi)f o rs o m e
i ∈ I. Throughout the paper, we keep the total endowments of each commodity
ﬁxed. Let P denote the set of Pareto optimal allocations and let IR denote the set
of individually rational allocations x such that ui(x) ≥ ui(w)f o ra l li ∈ I.L e tF de-
2For a related liquidity based approximation result see also Okuno and Schmeidler (1986).










Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption on the fundamentals of
the exchange economy:
Assumption 1 For each i ∈ I, ui is strictly monotone, strictly-concave, element
of Cr, r ≥ LI, and the closure of the indiﬀerence curves through wi are contained
in <L
++ and remain bounded away from the boundary of the consumption set.
2.1 The one-shot market game
In this section we describe the Shapley-Shubik (1977) market game of non-cooperative
exchange. Each trader makes bids and oﬀers of commodities at trading posts where
commodities are exchanged; all bids are denoted in some numeraire commodity,
which we set to be commodity 1. Traders are allowed to make oﬀers in all the other
commodities 2,...,L, each one traded on one of L − 1 trading posts. A strategic




L)w h e r ebi
l denotes the bid
for commodity l while qi
l denotes the oﬀer of commodity l, l =2 ,...,L. The corre-











1, 0 ≤ qi
l ≤ wi
l,l=2 ,...,L}.A l l b i d s a n d o ﬀers have
to be non-negative and the oﬀer of a commodity made by a trader cannot exceed
his endowment of that commodity. For each action proﬁle s =( s1,...,sI), at the









l. The corresponding price is πl(s)=Bl
Ql if Bl > 0a n dQl > 0; πl(s)=0
otherwise. For each trader i, the allocation rule determines commodity holdings as
















l =2 ,...,L.I fπl =0 ,xi
l(s)=wi
l, for all i ∈ I.L e tvi(si,s −i) be the payoﬀ associ-
ated with s. A Nash equilibrium proﬁle is s∗ such that vi(s∗i,s ∗
−i) ≥ vi(si,s ∗
−i), for
all si ∈ Si(wi)a n di ∈ I. A Nash equilibrium proﬁle s∗ such that bi∗
l > 0,qi∗
l > 0
for all l =2 ,...,L and i ∈ I is a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium
proﬁle s∗ such that bi∗





1, 0 <q i∗
l <w i
l for all l =2 ,...,L and
i ∈ I is an interior Nash equilibrium.L e t N(w) denote the set of interior Nash
equilibrium allocations of the market game.
6I nt h eo n e - s h o tm a r k e tg a m ew i t hv a r i a b l eo ﬀers, observe that the trivial Nash
equilibrium where b∗i
l = q∗i
l =0f o ra l ll and i ∈ I, always exists and yields the initial
endowments as the ﬁnal allocation. When w ∈ P∩<LI
++, there is also an interior Nash
equilibrium at which individuals consume their initial endowments guaranteeing that
N(w)∩P 6= φ,s i n c ew would be an element of such an intersection (see, for instance,
Dubey and Rogawski (1990)). What happens when w/ ∈ P? Consider the following
three properties:
• (P1) (Static ineﬃciency) If w/ ∈ P,t h e nN(w) ∩ P = φ.
• (P2) (Weak gains from trade) If w/ ∈ P,t h e r ee x i s t sx ∈ N(w)s u c ht h a t
ui(xi) ≥ ui(wi)f o ra l li ∈ I,w i t hui(xi) >u i(wi)f o rs o m ei ∈ I.
• (P3) (Strong gains from trade) If w/ ∈ P,t h e r ee x i s t sx ∈ N(w)s u c ht h a t
ui(xi) >u i(wi)f o ra l li ∈ I.
(P1) requires that whenever the endowments in an exchange economy are Pareto
suboptimal, there is no interior Nash equilibrium allocation that is also Pareto
optimal. (P2) requires that whenever the endowments in an exchange economy are
Pareto suboptimal, there is nevertheless some interior Nash equilibrium allocation
that makes at east one trader better-oﬀ relative to his endowments. (P3) requires
that whenever the endowments in an exchange economy are Pareto suboptimal,
there is some interior Nash equilibrium allocation that makes all traders better-oﬀ
relative to their endowments.
Although when we state results in later sections we directly assume that one or
all of (P1),(P2),(P3) characterize N(w) whenever w/ ∈ P, it is worth pointing out
that when preferences and endowments satisfy Assumption 1,D u b e ya n dR o g a w s k i
(1990) show that (P1),( P2), (P3) characterize N(w) whenever w/ ∈ P (see also
Peck, Shell and Spear (1992) for simillar results in a related market game). Further,
Dubey and Rogawski (1990) also imply that if w ∈ N(w), then w ∈ P.
We conclude this section with a result that characterizes the set of interior Nash
equilibria. Consider two diﬀerent endowment vectors w and w0 with the same set
of feasible allocations (i.e., the aggregate amount of each commodity is the same at
w and w0) but there is some individual ¯ ı who is better oﬀ at w0 relative to w.I n
7the following proposition (see Shapley (1976) for a simillar argument in the case of
two commodities and two individuals) we show that there exists an interior Nash
equilibrium with endowments w0 at which individual¯ ı is better oﬀ than at a diﬀerent
interior Nash equilibrium with endowments w. Remark that the result stated below
(and proved in the appendix) is a direct proof that N(w) is non-empty whenever
w/ ∈ P.3 It also shows that N(w) is characterized by (P3) whenever w/ ∈ P.
Proposition 1 Suppose preferences and endowments of individuals satisfy Assump-








l , l = 1,...,L such that u¯ ı(w¯ ı) <u ¯ ı(w0¯ ı) for some ¯ ı ∈ I.T h e n , t h e r e e x i s t s
x ∈ N(w) and x0 ∈ N(w0) such that u¯ ı(x¯ ı) <u ¯ ı(x0¯ ı) for the same individual ¯ ı.
Proof. See appendix. QED.
Proposition 1, together with Dubey and Rogawski (1990) result that if w ∈
P ∩ <LI
++ then w ∈ N(w), guarantees the non-emptiness of N(w) for exchange
economies that satisfy Assumption 1.
2.2 The market game with retrading
From the results discussed in the preceeding section, it follows that the gains from
trade are never exhausted after a one-period exchange. Therefore there are always
incentives to retrade. In this section we describe an exchange mechanism that takes
into account these incentives. Trading posts can reopen over a sequence of ﬁnite
or inﬁnite periods, t =0 ,1,...,T.A t e a c h t an action for trader i is a vector si
t.
The corresponding set of strategic actions at t for each trader i is Si
t(xi
t−1), since
t h ee n d o w m e n t sf o rt h et r a d e r sa tt i m et are the allocations obtained from trading
in the previous period. Start from si
−1 =( 0 ,...,0) for all i ∈ I and xi
l,−1 = wi
l,
for all l = 1,...,L and for all i ∈ I. For each strategic action proﬁle st,i nt h e
trading post for commodity l, the aggregate bid is Bl,t, the aggregate oﬀer is Ql,t,
with the corresponding price πl,t(st), deﬁned as in the static game. For each trader
i,t h ea l l o c a t i o n sxi
t(st)a r ea l s od e ﬁned as before. Along a sequence of action
3Dubey and Shubik (1978) show, under weaker assumptions, that the set of non-trivial Nash
equilibria is non-empty.
8proﬁles s = {s0,...,st,....}, we say that player i stops trading after period ˜ Ti iﬀ
bi
l,t0 = qi
l,t0 =0f o ra l lt0 ≥ ˜ Ti, l =2 ,...,L and bi
l,t0 6=0 ,qi
l,t0 6=0f o ra l lt0 < ˜ Ti,
l =2 ,...,L. Even though traders can stop trading at diﬀerent times, it is convenient
not to complicate notation by explicitly keeping track of traders who drop out. We
can do so without loss of generality as the bids and oﬀers of a trader can be zero at
any round of trade and hence a trader i w h os t o p st r a d i n ga ts o m ep e r i o d˜ Ti can be
counted as a market player who makes zero bids and oﬀe r si na l lp e r i o d si n c l u d i n g
and subsequent to ˜ Ti.
In what follows we shall consider two models of retrading, labeled as myopic
and far-sighted.
Case 1 (Myopic retrading): When retrading is myopic,a te a c hn e wr o u n d
of retrading traders behave in a very simple way: at each new round of retrading,
they choose a vector of bids and oﬀers that constitutes a static Nash equilibrium
to the ﬁnal allocation obtained from the previous round of trade. In the notation
developed before, at each t, the strategy proﬁle chosen, st,s a t i s ﬁes the condition
that xt(st) ∈ N(xt−1). Traders consume when they stop trading.4 As the utility
function of each trader is continuous and the set of feasible allocations compact, we
remark that even when ˜ Ti = ∞, the payoﬀ to any player i remains well-deﬁned.
Myopic traders can be seen as traders who do not expect that trading posts can
be reopened, so they play their best responses as if the current trading round were
the last. Consistent with this, we will study myopic retrading without discounting,
even though the results extend to the case where discounting occurs.
Case 2 (Far-sighted retrading): When retrading is far-sighted,a l lt r a d e r s
know that future play will, in general, be conditioned on the outcomes of the current
round of trade. Here, as before, we assume that an individual trader consumes
only when she has stopped trading. However, now we endow each trader i with a
common discount factor δ.W h e nT is ﬁnite, δ lies in [0,1]. When T = ∞, δ lies in




A history of play at period t is ht = {s0,...,st−1}. The corresponding set of histories
4Note that the assumption that each trader consumes when he stops trading is only made for
simplicity, and it is not crucial for the results, as discussed in Section 6.
5We interpret δ as a measure of the cost of reopening trading posts in any new round of trade.




t : Ht → Si
t for all t.D e n o t e b y σi|ht the restriction of σi to the subgame
from period t after history ht.Ap u r es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle σ =( σ1,...,σI) is a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium (SPE henceforth) if, for every ht,t h er e s t r i c t i o nσi|ht for all
traders i ∈ I is a Nash equilibrium in the subgame from period t.L e t˜ X(δ,w,T)
denote the set of SPE allocations of the market game with far-sighted retrading.
3A n e x a m p l e
In this section, we analyze retrading in an example. There are two commodities
and two individuals, with quasi-linear utility functions uk(x)=xk
1 + fk(xk
2), k =
i,j.W ea s s u m et h a tfk(.) is strictly monotone, strictly concave, twice-continuously
diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the boundary condition that limx2→0 ∂fk(x2)=∞ for




2 = 1. We focus on retrading in the “sell-all” market game.
The “sell-all” version of the Shapley-Shubik market game is obviously simpler than
t h ev a r i a b l eo ﬀers version: At each time t where trader i is still active, his oﬀer is
assumed to equal xi
2,t−1, which is the endowment of commodity 2 inherited from
the trades of the previous period. Other than for this simpliﬁcation, the strategies,
aggregate variables, and the allocation rules are identical to the more general variable
oﬀers model described before.6 In this case there is a unique Nash equilibrium with
trade in the one-shot market game.7 This means that ﬁnitely repeated trade would
not add anything, whereas we now show that ﬁnite retrading leads the traders
towards the competitive allocation even if they are myopic.
It will be convenient to refer to wi
2 = αi
0 ∈ (0,1) as individual i0s initial share of
commodity 2 and αi
t as individual i0s share at the end of round t − 1 of retrading.
6One additional diﬀerence would be in the precise deﬁnition of what it means to stop trading
in the sell-all market game. We avoid the formal deﬁnitions since they are not relevant for this
example, but the intuitive feature of any such deﬁnition is that traders must bid the exact amounts
that give them back the endowments obtained with their last real trade.
7The existence of an equilibrium with trade follows from Dubey (1980), Remark 2. Further,
using Remark 5 in Dubey and Rogowski (1990), it also follows that if w/ ∈ P then Nsellall(w)
satisﬁes (P1),( P2), (P3).
10For the moment, we simply assume that at any round of trade, all traders have
enough of the numeraire commodity to ensure existence of an interior one-shot
Nash equilibrium in any one round of trade8.
Using the allocation rule, we obtain that at any round of retrading t, t =0 ,1,...,
if the current proﬁle of actions is st =( b
j
2,t,b i











where Bt = bi
2,t +b
j




t+1,i ft h ec u r r e n tp r o ﬁle
of actions st is an interior Nash equilibrium, we can rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions
of traders to obtain the dynamical system that characterizes the evolution of the





















Evidently, a stationary point of the preceeding map is an interior allocation on the
Pareto frontier. Moreover, as both individuals have quasi-linear utility functions, the
allocations of commodity 2 is uniquely determined at an interior Pareto optimum.
Let ¯ αi denote individual i0s share of commodity 2 at the interior Pareto optimum.
Suppose αi











































¢ < 1,w em u s th a v et h a t(1−¯ αi)









8By rewriting the ﬁrst -order conditions for individual i at an interior Nash equilibrium, at






























1,t for i =1 ,2. Starting from t = 1 and applying the
above equality and inequality recursively, we obtain that at each T























0 − 1, i 6= j, i,j =1 ,2.
Without loss of generality, as limx2→0 ∂f
k(x2)=∞ for k = i,j,a te a c ht, α
i
t lies in a compact set
bounded away from 0 and 1. If follows that maxT 0≤T K
i





T 0, i =1 ,2, an interior Nash equilibrium exists at each t.

























Notice that if the above ratio is equal to one we must be on the Pareto frontier.




























. By repeating the above argument from ˜ t,i tf o l l o w s




converges to (1−¯ αi)
¯ αi and therefore, αi
t to ¯ αi. A symmetric
argument establishes convergence when αi
0 > ¯ αi. An immediate consequence is
that the sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading must converge to
the Pareto frontier. Moreover, note that from the equations that determine ﬁnal
allocations, we also obtain that individuals consumption of commodity 1 is identical
to that at the competitive equilibrium.
What about far-sighted retrading? We show that the sequence of allocations
generated by myopic retrading can be supported as SPE outcomes when T is very
large but ﬁnite. Consider the sequence of allocations y1,...,yt,...,w i t hy0 = w,
associated with myopic retrading. Note that yt = Nf(yt−1),9 t = 1,...,w i t ht h e
associated sequence of payoﬀs u(y1),...,u(yt),... in utility space <2. Consider the
following strategy proﬁle ˜ σ.F o r t ≤ T + 1,p l a y˜ st such that yi
t = xi(˜ st)( a n d
˜ ui
t = ui(xi(˜ st))) as long as ˜ ht = {˜ s0,..., ˜ st−1}; otherwise, if there has been a deviation,
play s0
t such that x(s0
t)=Nf(xt−1), for all t ≤ T.W en e e dt os h o wt h a t˜ σ is a SPE.
By construction, after any deviation, both players continue to choose bids according
to one-shot Nash equilibria. As all sequences of allocations generated by one-shot
Nash equilibria converge to the same allocation for both commodities, no player has
an incentive to deviate when T is large.
9The subscript f refers to “ﬁxed” oﬀers, since in this example oﬀers are not strategic.
124 Myopic retrading
We start the general analysis with myopic retrading. We show that, starting from
an arbitrary conﬁguration of initial endowments, traders are able to converge to
some allocation in the Pareto set. Nevertheless, convergence cannot take place in
a ﬁnite number of rounds of myopic retrading. We state the results only for the
market game with variable oﬀers described in Section 2.2, but we note that the
same results also obtain for the “sell-all” market game (as one could guess from the
previous section).
The following deﬁnition identiﬁes the sequences of allocations that are consistent
with myopic retrading.
Deﬁnition of Myopic Retrading: A sequence of allocations {xt}, t = 1,...is
generated by myopic retrading if and only if it satisﬁes the inclusion xt ∈ N(xt−1),
for all t ≥ 1.10 An allocation y is stationary with myopic retrading if and only if
y = N(y).
Some notation is needed before proving the main result of this section. For any
allocation y,l e tu(y)=( u1(y1),...,uI(yI)). For any K ⊂ <LI,l e tu(K)={u(y):
y ∈ K}.O b s e r v e t h a tu(K) ⊂ <I,f o ra l lK.L e t k.k denote the Euclidian norm.
Then, we deﬁne the distance between a vector y and a set K as d(u(y),u(K)) ≡
infˆ u∈u(K) ku(y) − ˆ uk.
Proposition 2 Consider w ∈ <LI
++,s u p p o s et h a tN(w) satisﬁes (P1)-(P2) when-
ever w/ ∈ P. Then, for any w = y0 ∈ <LI
++, there exists a sequence of allocations
{˜ yt}, t =0 ,1,..., ˜ yt ∈ N(˜ yt−1) for all t ≥ 1,s u c ht h a t ,f o ra n yε > 0,t h e r ei sa
T>0 with d(u(˜ yt),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε for all t>T.
Proof. If w ∈ P,t h e nw = N(w) and we are done. Therefore assume that
w/ ∈ P. Consider the sequence of sets N1,...,Nt,...,w i t hy0 = w,a n dNt = {x :
x ∈ N(y),f o rs o m ey∈ Nt−1}, t = 1,..., with the associated sequence of sets
u(N1),...,u(Nt),... in utility space <I.B y ( P2) there exists a set of sequences,
denoted by {˜ Ut}, where each sequence in this set, ˜ ut, t =0 ,1,...,i ss u c ht h a t
10x0 is obviously the initial endowment.
13˜ ut ∈ u(Nt) for all t and ˜ ut+1 > ˜ ut at each t.D e n o t e b y {˜ Yt} (and, respectively,
by ˜ yt,t =0 ,1,...its generic element) the associated set of sequences of allocations
generated by myopic retrading and satisfying P2 (all starting from y0 = w). Note
that for each i ∈ I, any sequence ˜ ui
t, t =0 ,1,...,i n{˜ Ui
t} is bounded above, as
the utility of each individual is continuous and the set of feasible allocations is
compact. Let ¯ ui denote the supremum of the sequence ˜ ui
t. As every increasing
sequence converges to the supremum, it follows that the sequence ˜ ut converges to
¯ u =( ¯ u1,..., ¯ uI), the component-wise supremum of ˜ ut =( ˜ u1
t,..., ˜ uI
t), t =0 ,1,....
Moreover, it also follows that the associated sequence of allocations ˜ yt,t =0 ,1,...
converges to some allocation ¯ y such that u(¯ y)=¯ u. By considering every sequence
of utilities in {˜ Ut} and the corresponding sequences in {˜ Yt},w eo b t a i nas e to f
allocations ¯ Yw which consists of the limit allocations of each of those sequences of
allocations ˜ yt,t =0 ,1,.... If we show that there exists some sequence of allocations
˜ yt,t=0 ,1,.... in {˜ Yt} that converges to ¯ y ∈ ¯ Yw such that ¯ y is stationary under
myopic retrading, we are done: in fact, as Dubey and Rogawski (1990) have shown
that if w ∈ N(w)t h e nw ∈ P,i f¯ y = N(¯ y), ¯ y ∈ P.
To this end, deﬁne the binary relation ≺w on F as follows: Given two feasible
allocations x and y, y ≺ x if x ∈ Nt and y ∈ Nt0, t0 <t ,f o rs o m eNt, Nt0 in
the sequence of sets N1,...,Nt,... (with y0 = w)a n de i t h e r( a )x ∈ N(y)a n d
ui(x) ≥ ui(y)f o ra l li ∈ I and ui(x) >u i(y)f o rs o m ei ∈ I or (b) x is the limit of
a sequence of allocations {xt}, t = 1,...with xt ∈ N(xt−1), where x0 = y.R e m a r k
that ≺w is transitive: if y ≺w x and x ≺w z,t h e nb y( b )y ≺w z.T h e r e f o r e ,
≺w is a partial order on F (page 13, Kelley (1955)). Consider any sequence of
allocations ˜ yt,t =0 ,1,....in {˜ Yt} (i.e., in the set of sequences generated by myopic
retrading satisfying (P2)). Note that either ˜ yt ≺w ˜ yt0 or ˜ yt0 ≺w ˜ yt for all t 6= t0;
moreover, if ˜ yt ≺w ˜ yt0 and ˜ yt0 ≺w ˜ yt,˜ yt =˜ yt0.T h e r e f o r e , ≺w is a linear ordering
(page 14, Kelley (1955)) and hence any sequence in {˜ Yt} is a chain given ≺w (page
15, Kelley (1955)). By Kuratowski’s lemma (page 33, Kelley (1955)), each chain in
a partially ordered set is contained in a maximal chain. Moreover, any chain in F
under ≺w, and hence even the maximal chain, is a (weak) subset of some sequence
of allocations in {˜ Yt}. We have already shown that every sequence in {˜ Yt} converges
14to some allocation ¯ y. Focusing on the maximal chain, ˜ yt ≺w ¯ y for all t, and hence ¯ y
is an upper bound (page 13, Kelley (1955)) of the chain consisting of the sequence
of allocations ˜ yt,t=0 ,1,... under ≺w.G i v e n t h a t F is partially ordered under
≺w and every linearly ordered subset has an upper bound, Zorn’s lemma (page 33,
Kelley (1955)) guarantees that F has a maximal element under ≺w.B yd e ﬁnition,
a maximal element cannot preceed any other element of F. It follows that there is
some sequence of allocations in {˜ Yt} that contains a maximal point. From this, it
follows that, as the maximal element of a sequence of allocations must be its upper
bound and hence its limit allocation, there is some ¯ y ∈ ¯ Yw such that ¯ y = N(¯ y), and
therefore ¯ y ∈ P. QED.
The above proposition demonstrates that starting from an arbitrary Pareto sub-
optimal vector of initial endowments, there is some sequence of allocations, gener-
ated by myopic retrading, that converges to an allocation that is stationary under
myopic retrading, and hence to some allocation on the Pareto set. Note that each
proﬁle of actions along the myopic retrading sequence constitutes a static Nash equi-
librium to the allocation inherited from the preceeding round of trade. By (P2), for
every conﬁguration of Pareto suboptimal endowments, there is a static Nash equilib-
rium at which allocations are such that every trader is at least as well-oﬀ and some
trader(s) strictly better-oﬀ relative to their initial endowments. This implies that
the sequence of utility proﬁles associated with the sequence of allocations generated
by myopic retrading is an increasing sequence. But then, along each dimension,
corresponding to a speciﬁc individual, this sequence of utilities must converge to its
supremum, which in turn determines the limit of the sequence of allocations gen-
erated by myopic retrading. To complete the proof, it suﬃces to show that some
limit allocation must be stationary under myopic retrading. To this end, we deﬁne
a binary relation (on the set of feasible allocations) which is a suborder of pareto
dominance. Each sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading satisfying
(P2) is a linearly ordered chain under this binary relation, and under this binary
relation, any linearly ordered chain is a subset of some sequence of allocations in the
set of all sequences of allocations generated by myopic retrading satisfying (P2).
By Kuratowski’s lemma, this set must contain a maximally ordered chain under
15this binary relation. As each sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading
has an upper bound (as the set of feasible allocations is compact), by Zorn’s lemma
some sequence of allocations in the set of all sequences of allocations generated by
myopic retrading satisfying (P2) has a maximal element. If a sequence of alloca-
tions generated by myopic retrading satisfying (P2) has a maximal element, then
the maximal element must be its upper bound and therefore its limit allocation. But
then this limit allocation is stationary under myopic retrading and hence a Pareto
optimal allocation.11,12
Evidently, the preceeding proposition goes through with the stronger require-
ment that N(w)s a t i s ﬁes (P3) whenever w/ ∈ P. The result (as well as the next
one) can also be extended to δ < 1. The reason for dealing only with δ = 1 in
the propositions of this section is that this is the case where the assumptions of
myopic retrading make the most sense intuitively: in fact, a myopic player who does
not discount the future can be assumed to believe he will consume right away. So
myopia here means that traders can’t predict that after trading they will change
their mind, trading again instead of consuming.
Remark 1 A te a c hs t a g eo fm y o p i cr e t r a d i n g ,t h eﬁnal allocation from the preceed-
ing round of trade deﬁnes the distribution of endowments for a “new” economy. As
the sequence of allocations converge to some allocation on the Pareto frontier, in the
limit we obtain an economy with Pareto optimal endowments. As no trade is the
only outcome at the competitive equilibrium of an economy with Pareto optimal
endowments, in this sense the converging sequence of allocations associated with
myopic retrading converges to competitive equilibria of the limit economy as well.
Remark 2 Proposition 2 holds even when we limit attention to sequences of Pareto
undominated Nash equilibrium allocations in the paths of myopic retrading. In
11For a similar argument see Allen, Dutta and Polemarchakis (1999) (see observation 8 page 16)
who study a convergent iterative process where at each step individuals exchange assets to share
risks inherent in the multiplicity of competitive equilibria.
12Note that it is not possible to show that all limit allocations are stationary points under myopic
retrading, because some sequences of allocations generated by myopic retrading satisfying (P2)m a y
have a limit allocation where the Nash equilibrium correspondence fails to be continuous.
16other words, consider the sequences of sets ˜ N1,..., ˜ Nt,..., where ˜ Nt are the Pareto
undominated allocations in Nt, t = 1,.... Remark that as the set of interior Nash
equilibrium allocations Nt is a closed subset of the set of feasible allocations, it is
also compact, and therefore ˜ Nt is non-empty.13
Although Proposition 2 demonstrates that traders will obtain allocations in the
vicinity of the Pareto set, it still leaves open the question of whether traders are able
to converge to an allocation on the Pareto frontier after a ﬁnite number of rounds
of myopic retrading.
Proposition 3 If w/ ∈ P and N(w) satisﬁes (P1), there is no T<∞,a n dn o
sequence of allocations {yt}, t = 1,..., yt ∈ N(yt−1),w i t hy0 = w and t =0 ,...,T,
such that yT ∈ P.
Proof. If yT ∈ P,t h e nyT = N(yT). Moreover, as w/ ∈ P,t h e r em u s tb es o m e
T0 <T such that the allocation obtained at T0 − 1, yT0−1,i sn o ti nP, while for all
t ≥ T0 yt ∈ P.T h e nw em u s th a v et h a tyT0 ∈ N(yT0−1)∩P, a contradiction. QED.
The intuition behind this result is simple. If trade concludes after some ﬁnite
length of time, at some ﬁnite stage in the game it must be the case that while the
traders’ inherited allocation from the previous period is Pareto suboptimal, the ﬁnal
allocation they obtain after reopening trading posts is both (a) a Pareto optimal
allocation, and (b) satisﬁes the inequalities for a Nash equilibrium allocation for
the one-shot market game with the traders’ inherited allocation as the endowment.
But by (P1), with Pareto suboptimal endowments no Nash equilibrium allocation
of the one-shot market game can ever be Pareto optimal. This guarantees that no
13In market games like the one in Peck, Shell and Spear (1992), the presence of a budget constraint
and the bankruptcy rules to insure feasibility imply that the equilibrium of the sell-all model is
also an equilibrium of the more general variable oﬀers model, and under some conditions (see for
instance Goenka, Kelly and Spear (1998) such an equilibrium is the “best” Nash equilibrium in
Nt. However, in the Shapley-Shubik model that we use it is not true that the equilibrium of the
sell-all model is always an equilibrium of the more general variable oﬀers model, and even when it is
there is no reason why it should be better than any other equilibrium. Hence, since in the Shapley
Shubik model there is no salient type of equilibrium that always belongs to ˜ Nt, the analysis does
not beneﬁt from limiting attention to the undominated Nash equilibria.
17allocation on the Pareto set will be attained by traders after a ﬁnite number of
rounds of myopic retrading. Without discounting, this implies that trading posts
will always be reopened. This makes the assumption of myopic traders hard to
swallow, but the next section shows that not only the results above extend to far-
sighted behavior, but also that far-sighted behavior becomes indistinguishable from
myopic behavior over the process of retrading.
5 Far-sighted retrading
Let us now allow traders to be far-sighted. The approximation result of Proposition
2i sc o n ﬁrmed, and we show that the set of SPE paths “converges” to the set of
myopic retrading paths as traders keep retrading. Far-sighted retrading can lead
the economy to Pareto improvements “faster” than myopic retrading, but doesn’t
have to. We will see that it is possible to have a new kind of market failure with far-
sighted retrading: traders may delay trade along a SPE path merely because they
expect other traders to do the same. We will also see that anonymous strategies,
i.e., strategies that can only be functions of prices and aggregate demand for each
commodity, are suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of SPE proﬁles such that the
ﬁnal allocation converges to the Pareto set. On the other hand, the appealing
property of renegotiation proofness, appropriately deﬁned for our context, can only
be proved by allowing for individual punishment strategies.
The next proposition and its corollary provide a negative result, in line with
Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 If w/ ∈ P,a n dN(w) satisﬁes (P1), ˜ X(δ,w,T) ∩ P = φ,f o ra l l
δ ∈ [0,1],a n da l lT<∞.
Proof. Let ¯ T ≤ T be the ﬁrst period at which an allocation x ¯ T ∈ P is obtained
along some SPE path. Given that trade cannot take place after reaching the Pareto
set, it must be the case that traders stop trading at some ¯ T ≤ T, i.e., bi
l,t = qi
l,t =
0 ∀i,∀l,∀t>¯ T.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e¯ T is the ﬁrst period where p is reached, x ¯ T−1 / ∈ P.
As x ¯ T−1 / ∈ P,b y(P1), N(x¯ T−1)∩P = φ. This is a contradiction, since, at the last
18round of trade, any SPE proﬁle requires the ﬁnal allocation to be in the set of Nash
equilibrium allocations with respect to the inherited allocation. QED.
Corollary 1 If w/ ∈ P,a n dN(w) satisﬁes (P1), ˜ X(δ,w,∞) ∩ P = φ,f o ra l l
δ ∈ [0,1).
Proof. When δ ∈ [0,1), any trader gets a payoﬀ of zero if he trades indeﬁnitely.
Therefore, along any SPE path, all traders will stop trading after some ﬁnite length
of time, implying that there exists a ¯ T<∞ such that bi
l,t = qi
l,t =0f o ra l lt ≥ ¯ T,
l =2 ,...,L.T r a d e s t o p s b e f o r e¯ T0 =i n f T{T : bi
l,t = qi
l,t =0for all t ≥ T, l =
2,...,L, i ∈ I}. Then, the proof immediately follows from Proposition 4. QED.
Even far-sighted traders cannot obtain allocations on the Pareto set. As trade
always concludes after some ﬁnite length of time, at some ﬁnite stage in the game,
it must be the case that both the traders’ inherited allocation from the previous
period and the ﬁnal one are Pareto suboptimal, otherwise there would be a contra-
diction with (P1). We now extend the approximation result obtained under myopic
retrading to this world of far-sighted players.
Proposition 5 If N(w) satisﬁes (P1)-(P3) whenever w/ ∈ P ∩ <LI
++,t h e n ,f o r
every ε > 0,t h e r ei saT and δ and y ∈ ˜ X(δ,w,T) such that d(u(y),u(P)) < ε for
all δ ∈ [δ,1], T ≥ T.
Proof. Using Proposition 2, for δ close to 1 we obtain that whenever w/ ∈ P∩<LI
++,
if N(w)s a t i s ﬁes (P1)-(P3) whenever w/ ∈ P,f o ra n yw = y0 ∈ <LI
++,t h e r ee x i s t s
a sequence of allocations {˜ yt}, t =0 ,1,...,˜ yt ∈ N(˜ yt−1)f o ra l lt ≥ 1, such that, for
any ε > 0, there is a T>0w i t hd(u(˜ yt),u(P ∩IR)) < ε for all t>T.N o wc o n s t r u c t
the following strategy proﬁle ˜ σ.F o rt ≤ T + 1,p l a y˜ st such that yi
t = xi(˜ st)( a n d
˜ ui
t = ui(xi(˜ st))) as long as ˜ ht = {˜ s0,..., ˜ st−1}; otherwise, if there has been a deviation,
play bi
¯ t = qi
¯ t =0 ,i ∈ I, for all ¯ t>t . Finally, when t>T+ 1,p l a ybi
t = qi
t =0 .
To complete the proof, we need to show that ˜ σ is a SPE. By construction, observe
that no player has an incentive to deviate after T +1 or in any subgame following a
deviation from the SPE path. It remains to check that no player has an incentive to
deviate at any t ≤ T +1. Indeed, consider player i who deviates at t choosing some
19action s0i
t .A s bi
t0 = qi
t0 =0 ,i ∈ I,f o ra l lt0 >t ,d e n o t ei’s maximum payoﬀ from
such a deviation by δt+1vi(s0i
t , ˜ s−i,t), where xi(s0i
t , ˜ s−i,t) is the resulting allocation
for i when i chooses s0i
t while all other players choose according to ˜ σ. On the other
hand, his payoﬀ from continuing to choose according to ˜ σ is δTi(˜ σ)ui(y). As yt ∈
N(yt−1), we must have vi(s0i





t , ˜ s−i,t)=δt+1[δTi(˜ σ)−t−1ui(yi
Ti(˜ σ))−vi(s0i
t , ˜ s−i,t)]. Let δt+1
i
be such that [δTi(˜ σ)−t−1ui(yi
Ti(˜ σ)) − vi(s0i
t , ˜ s−i,t)] = 0. Set δ =i n f i,0≤t≤Ti(˜ σ)−1 δt+1
i .
It follows that for all δ ∈ [δ,1), ˜ σ is a SPE strategy proﬁle. QED.
The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the sequence of allocations generated by
myopic retrading that converges to the Pareto set can be supported as SPE outcome
with far-sighted retrading when traders are suﬃciently patient. To understand the
main idea of the proof, consider ﬁrst the case where δ = 1. The strategy proﬁle is
constructed so that traders continue to choose the bids and oﬀers that implement
the sequence of allocations generated by myopic trade. If a trader deviates at some
round of trade, in all subsequent rounds of trade all traders make null bids and
oﬀers at the trading post for each commodity, thus ensuring that no trade is the
outcome. In the no trade phase, no individual trader has an incentive to deviate.
This is because the bids and oﬀers at any round of trade constitute a static Nash
equilibrium to the ﬁnal allocation from the previous round of trade, which implies
no individual trader can gain by deviating, as a deviation will be followed by no
trade in all subsequent rounds. Under (P3),a l lt r a d e r sstrictly gain in utility along
some sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading. This implies that if
traders are suﬃciently patient, they will prefer to retrade over consuming their
current allocation. Remark that the the above argument would also go through if at
each t, along the equilibrium path of play, traders were required to choose strategies
according to some undominated myopic Nash equilibrium.
The following corollary shows that Proposition 5 goes through even when strate-
gies are conditioned only on a subset of the entire history of play namely, the aggre-
gate bids and oﬀers at each trading post in the preceeding round of trade. Denote by
σM an anonymous strategy proﬁle where each player i conditions his choice of bids
and oﬀers in period t,( bi
t,qi
t), only on Bl,t−1 and Ql,t−1, l =2 ,...,L (and therefore
20on the preceeding period’s market price vector πt−1(st−1) ) ,a n do nh e ro w ni n d i v i d -
ual allocation xi
t−1(st−1). Let ˜ XM(δ,w,T) the set of SPE allocations for strategy
proﬁles in ΣM.
Corollary 2 For every ε > 0,t h e r ei saT and δ and y ∈ ˜ XM(δ,w,T) such that
d(u(y),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε for all δ ∈ [δ,1], T ≥ T.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to observe that the sequence of allocations along the SPE
path, y0,....,yt,...., used in the proof of Proposition 4 can also be supported by a
strategy proﬁle ˜ σM speciﬁed as follows. For t ≤ T,p l a y˜ st as long as Bt−1 = ˜ Bt−1
and Qt−1 = ˜ Qt−1; otherwise, if there has been a deviation, play bi
¯ t = qi
¯ t =0 ,i ∈ I,
for all ¯ t>t . Finally, when t>T,p l a ybi
t = qi
t = 0. It is immediate that σM ∈ ΣM
is also a SPE strategy proﬁle. QED.
Although anonymous strategy proﬁles minimize the amount of information used
to sustain a sequence of myopic Nash equilibria along the equilibrium path of a SPE
strategy proﬁle, Proposition 5 is problematic because deviations from the equilib-
rium path of play are punished by no trade, but if the allocation reached is subop-
timal no trade is not retrade-proof. This leads us to deﬁne retrade-proof strategy
proﬁles. Consider a sequence of feasible allocations xt,t =0 ,1,... such that there
exists some ﬁnite time period T such that xt0 = xT for all t0 >T. For a given value
of δ, we say the sequence of allocations is retrade proof if there is no x ∈ N(xT)
such that ui(xT) < δui(x) for all i ∈ I.U n d e r t h e s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle σ,l e tT(σ)b e
the set of all time periods at which trade stops under the strategy proﬁle σ both on
or oﬀ the equilibrium path of play. Under the strategy proﬁle σ,l e tX(σ)b et h e
set of sequences of allocations generated by σ both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path
of play. It follows that for each sequence of allocations xt, t =0 ,1,...in X(σ)t h e r e
exists ˆ T ∈ T(σ)s u c ht h a txt0 = xˆ T for all t0 > ˆ T. Then, σ i sr e t r a d e - p r o o fi fe v e r y
sequence of allocations in X(σ) is retrade-proof. Let ˜ XR(δ,w,T)d e n o t et h es e to f
allocations supported by retrade proof SPE.
We now extend the approximation result obtained with anonymous strategy
proﬁl e st ot h ec a s ew h e r ew er e q u i r er e t r a d e - p r o o fS P E .F i xs o m eT>0.
21Proposition 6 If N(w) satisﬁes (P1)-(P3) whenever w/ ∈ P ∩ <LI
++,t h e n ,f o r
every ε > 0,t h e r ei saT and δ and y ∈ ˜ XR(δ,w,T) such that d(u(y),u(P)) < ε for
all δ ∈ [δ,1], T ≥ T.
Proof. See appendix. QED.
Suppose all traders are suﬃciently patient and that there are at least three active
traders on each side of a trading post. Consider a SPE strategy proﬁle where devia-
tions oﬀ the equilibrium path of play are not punished by no trade. What prevents
a trader from deviating from the equilibrium path of play proﬁle of bids and oﬀers?
By deﬁnition, the current proﬁle of bids and oﬀers is a one-shot Nash equilibrium. It
follows that a trader will deviate if she anticipates that in the continuation subgame,
there is an equilibrium which supports an allocation where she is better oﬀ relative
to the allocation obtained as the limit of the sequence of allocations along the SPE
path of play. To prevent such a contingency from occuring, the other traders punish
the deviating trader by coordinating at each subsequent round of trade on a interior
myopic Nash equlibrium at which the deviating trader is worse-oﬀ.N o w ,e a c hi n d i -
vidual trader strategies is conditioned on both the aggregate bids and oﬀers and on
the identity of the deviating trader. Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of such
as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle. When traders use such a strategy proﬁle, following a deviation,
bids and oﬀers in the continuation subgame are conditioned on the identity of the
deviator. Moreover, given δ,o ﬀ the equilibrium path of play, by constructrion such a
strategy proﬁl ea l l o w st r a d e r st or e o p e nt r a d i n gp o s t sa sl o n ga st h e r ea r ei n c e n t i v e s
to retrade.
Are there other SPE strategy proﬁles, which do not require players to imple-
ment allocations generated by myopic retrading but which, nevertheless, supports a
sequence of allocations that approximate the Pareto frontier? While the answer is
generally yes, the next proposition shows that any SPE strategy proﬁle must, after
some length of time, begin to look like a strategy proﬁle that implements allocations
generated by myopic retrading. Formally, for T = ∞, for any SPE strategy proﬁle σ,
let y1(σ),...,yt(σ),...,y Tσ(σ)( w h e r eyt = x(st(σ))) denote the allocations generated
along the equilibrium path of play associated with σ and Tσ denotes the last period
with trade under σ.F o r˜ T<T σ,l e ty1(σ),...,yt(σ),...,y ˜ T(σ)d e n o t ea˜ T truncation
22of Tσ. We say that a SPE strategy proﬁle σ approximates the Pareto frontier if for
ε > 0t h e r ee x i s t s ˜ T ≤ Tσ and y ˜ T(σ)s u c ht h a td(u(y ˜ T(σ)),u(P)) < ε.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
any ²>0, and w ∈ RLI
++,l e tN²(w)d e n o t et h es e to fn o n - t r i v i a l²−Nash equilibrium
allocations.14
Proposition 7 For any SPE strategy proﬁle σ that approximates the Pareto fron-
tier, for every ²,t h e r ei sa˜ T<T σ−1 such that for each t>˜ T, yt(σ) ∈ N²,t(yt−1(σ)).
Proof. Consider the sequence of strategies along the equilibrium path of play
of σ, s1(σ),...,st(σ),...sTσ(σ). At any t such that yt(σ) / ∈ N²(yt−1(σ)), there is
some player i whose maximum payoﬀ from a deviation, denoted by vi(si
t,s −i,t(σ)),
where xi(si
t, ˜ s−i,t(σ)) is the resulting allocation for i when she chooses si
t while all
other players choose according to σ, is such that vi(si
t,s −i,t(σ)) − ui(yi
t(σ)) > 0. By
choosing bi
t0 = qi
t0 =0 ,f o ra l lt0 >t ,p l a y e ri c a no b t a i nap a y o ﬀ δt+1vi(si
t,s −i,t(σ)).
As σ is SPE, it follows that δt+1vi(si
t,s −i,t(σ)) ≤ δ
˜ T+1ui(yi
t0(σ)) for all δ ∈ [ˆ δ,1]a n d
t0 >tand therefore, ui(yi
t0(σ)) >v i(si
t,s −i,t(σ)) >u i(yi
t(σ)). As σ approximates
the Pareto frontier, for every ²>0, there exists ˜ T such that if t>˜ T and t0 >t ,
ui(yi
t0(σ))−ui(yi
t(σ)) <²and therefore, vi(si
t,s −i,t(σ))−ui(yi
t(σ)) <²which implies
that yt+1(σ) ∈ N²t(yt(σ)). QED.
When at some t players do not choose bids and oﬀers according to myopic re-
trading, along they obtain an allocation yt / ∈ N(yt−1)( w h e r eyt−1 is the alloca-
tion obtained from t − 1). This implies that there must be some individual i who
would have incentive to deviate from the SPE strategy proﬁle at t and then choose
bi
t0 = qi
t0 =0f o ra l lt0 >t . Therefore, if {yt : t ≥ 0} is generated along some SPE
path of play, it must be the case that the gain in utility for i in the continuation
game along the SPE path of play from t+1 outweighs the gain in utility from devi-
ating at t. As we approach the Pareto frontier along a SPE, an individual’s gain in
the continuation game along the SPE path becomes smaller, and so must the gain in
utility by deviating from the equilibrium path of play. Remark that a similar result
goes through for when T is large but ﬁnite (simply substitute T for Tσ throughout).













−i)) − ² for all s
i ∈ S
i(w).
23It is intuitive that far-sighted retrading can lead the economy within a given
neighborhood of the Pareto frontier faster than myopic retrading. To see this,
consider δ < 1 and T such that d(u(yT),U(P ∩IR)) <² ,w h e r eyT is the allocation
obtained through the myopic retrading path y0,...,y t,...,yT. The same path can
be sustained as a SPE path of far-sighted retrading, hence far-sighted traders can
always do at least as well as myopic traders. They can also do strictly better:
Suppose that T>3; then it is possible to construct a SPE proﬁle where at the
ﬁrst round of trade the obtained allocation is directly yT−1 as long as yT−1 can
be attained by some combination of bids and oﬀers with the initial endowments w.
The threat of no trade in the last round can make deviations from this proﬁle not
attractive, if δ is high enough and the game satisﬁes P3.D o e st h i sm e a nt h a tf a r -
sighted retrading always leads to greater gains in eﬃciency? The answer is no, and
the following remark shows that there are also SPE of the game that make traders
worse oﬀ than with just one round of trade.15 A new type of market failure can also
arise: there are SPE where traders will delay trade only because all other traders
do the same.
Remark 3 By Proposition 1, we know that there always exists a static Nash equi-
librium in the one-shot market game where all traders gain relative to the no-trade
equilibrium. Denote the bid-oﬀer proﬁle that constitutes a Nash equilibrium with
trade s∗ =( b∗,q∗). Now suppose that traders are allowed to retrade in an extra




0,l)=( 0 ,0) for all l =2 ,...,L;( 2 )i fsi
0,l =( bi
0,l,qi
0,l)=( 0 ,0) for all
l =2 ,...,L,a n da l li ∈ I,p l a ys =( b∗,q∗)n e x tr o u n d ;o t h e r w i s e ,p l a ybi
1 = qi
1 =0 ,
for all i ∈ I. Then, for each δ ∈ (
u¯ ı(w¯ ı)






is a SPE. However, observe that for δ ∈ (
u¯ ı(w¯ ı)
u¯ ı(x¯ ı(s∗)),1), at ˜ σ,a l lt r a d e r so b t a i np a y -
oﬀs which are Pareto dominated by their payoﬀs corresponding to the static Nash
equilibrium.
The next result shows that the set of SPE allocations with far-sighted retrading
expands as δ becomes larger.
15Note also that the Pareto set can be approximated only in terms of ﬁnal allocation, whereas
discounting makes the convergence process itself “ineﬃciently long” in terms of utility.
24Proposition 8 Consider δ0,δ00 ∈ [0,1] such that δ0 ≤ δ00.F o r e a c hT<∞,t h e n ,
˜ X(δ0,w,T) ⊆ ˜ X(δ00,w,T).
Any allocation that satisﬁes the inequalities that characterize the sequence of
allocations along the SPE path for a speciﬁc δ must continue to do so as δ becomes
larger. The proof is in the Appendix, and the result can be easily extended to the
case where traders can retrade inﬁnitely often.
6 Discussion on consumption and asset trading
Throughout the paper we have made the simplifying assumption that consumption
by trader i may occur only after he has stopped trading. A natural question to ask
is whether therefore our results hold when individual traders can decide otherwise,
i.e., when they can opt to consume part of their current endowment instead of using
it all for trading purposes. We will divide the analysis of this issue in two parts.
First, we give a direct answer to this question, keeping the assumption that all
tradeable goods are also consumable. The second part of the analysis makes an
argument that in fact one of the best interpretations of our model ought to be the
case where the tradeable goods on the trading posts are assets, which are long-lived,
yield consumption indirectly, but are not directly consumable themselves. In the
second case, of course, the consumption issue becomes irrelevant.
Let us start by keeping the assumption that all tradeable are consumables.
Clearly, when the discount factor is equal to one it cannot make a diﬀerence, and
the SPE proﬁles that approximate points on the Pareto set remain SPE proﬁles even
when consumption is in principle allowed at any time. On the other hand, when
the discount factor is in the open interval (0,1), individuals will typically have an
incentive to consume (part of) their endowments even before leaving the market.
An important observation is that along a SPE path, the bids and oﬀers typically do
not exhaust the endowments at any round of trade. In other words, considering a
sequence of actions s0,...,st,...that constitutes a SPE path of far-sighted retrading,
it is typically the case that qi
t <x i
t−1 at all times.16 Therefore, individuals can
16Recall that we are looking at environments in which no trader has a shortage of tradeable
25consume a small fraction of their current endowments at each new round of trade
and not necessarily aﬀect the SPE proﬁle of retrading. Hence, it is obvious that
allowing traders to consume whenever they want the ﬁnal utilities must be higher.
But what matters here is that if δ is high enough the same path s0,...,st,... can
remain an equilibrium path of retrading. The equilibrium path used in the approx-
imation results is such that everybody is made better oﬀ by each successive round
of trade, and hence, for δ high enough, the utility diﬀerence can always compensate
for the longer wait to consume. A deviation to consume current endowments that
aﬀects the feasibility of bids and oﬀers at the current or subsequent rounds of trade
will not be proﬁtable.
Even though it should be clear from the above discussion that our assumption of
“consumption at the end” is irrelevant for the main results, it is also worth noting
that this consumption issue would not even be raised if the trading posts were just
markets for assets. Let x =( x1,...,xL) be reinterpreted as an allocation of assets.
For any xi,l e tyi =( yi
1,....,yi
M) be the associated allocation of commodities.17 Let
vi(y) represent trader i0s preferences over the commodity bundle y. Traders are
endowed with assets but not commodities. A feasible allocation of assets generates
a feasible allocation of commodities. An allocation of assets is Pareto optimal if and
only if the associated allocation of commodities is Pareto optimal. Traders trade
assets 2,...,L using asset l = 1 as numeraire. For simplicity, we assume that traders
cannot trade commodities directly. They can only trade commodities indirectly,
by trading assets. The retrading process, both myopic and far-sighted, is as in the
previous sections. The diﬀerence is that now at each round of trade, if xi
t is trader i0s
current allocation of assets, then yi
t is trader i0s current commodity bundle, which
he consumes to obtain a current utility of vi(yi






With this speciﬁcation, all our previous results apply by appropriately rephras-
ing the propositions and proofs. After all players have stopped trading, the ﬁnal
goods.
17As a metaphor, think of the allocation of assets as being allocation of trees, and the vector y
would be the corresponding allocation of fruits. People consume fruits, not trees, but trade trees
only in this interpretation of the model.
26allocation of assets will keep giving the same consumption bundle to all traders
thereafter every period. If we extended the model to allow for stochastic yields of
assets, then asset trading could continue forever, since every shock on the productiv-
ity of assets may change the incentives (or needs) of traders to readjust their asset
portfolio. Issues related to uncertainty and/or asymmetric information are however
beyond the objective of this paper.
7 Conclusion
The main result of this paper has been to show that allowing retrading in markets
where the one-shot allocations are ineﬃcient allows traders to approximate alloca-
tions on the Pareto frontier arbitrarily closely.
This “approximation” result, however, needs to be qualiﬁed on the following
grounds: (1) allocations on the Pareto frontier are never attained in ﬁnite time by
retrading; (2) getting to an allocation close to the Pareto frontier may take several
rounds of retrading and therefore, when traders discount future consumption heavily,
in payoﬀ space traders may still be far away from the Pareto frontier of utilities;
(3) there is a huge multiplicity of equilibria with retrading, and therefore not all
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium allocations with retrading are close to the Pareto
frontier; (4) in other contexts (see for instance Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999)), where
there are externalities in consumption and traders use trading mechanisms which
allow some subset of traders to be excluded from the market, retrading may not
approximate allocations on the Pareto frontier.
Beside the issue of eﬃciency, this paper has also demonstrated some interesting
“behavioral” properties of retrading processes. In particular, we have shown that
the set of equilibrium paths of retrading that converge to the Pareto frontier when
agents are forward looking shrinks towards the converging path of myopic retrading.
We have also shown by example that convergence holds even when there is a unique
Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game, i.e., in a context where ﬁnitely repeated
t r a d ec o u l dn o th a v ee ﬃcient equilibrium outcomes. The properties of retrading
that we have studied seem therefore to be quite general, and independent on the
assumptions made on the rationality of traders.
278 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt oa s s o c i a t et ot h eo r i g i n a le x -
change economy and market game, a pseudo exchange economy and market game.
In the original exchange economy, there are L commodities and individual i0s is
characterised by his consumption set <L
+,e n d o w m e n t sw ∈ <L
++ and utility func-
tion u : <L
+ → <. In the pseudo-exchange economy, commodity 1 is replaced by
L−1 copies of itself i.e. commodity 1 is replaced by commodities labelled by the pair
(1,l), l =2 ,...,L implying that there are 2(L−1) commodities. A commodity bun-
dle in the original excahnge economy is x ∈ <L. A commodity bundle in the pseudo
exchange economy is ˆ x =( ˆ x1,2,..., ˆ x1,L, ˆ x2,...,ˆ xL) ∈ <2(L−1) with
L P
l=2
ˆ x1,l = x1 and
ˆ xl = xl, l =2 ,...,L. The consumption set of individual i in the pseudo-exchange
economy is <
2(L−1)
+ . We abuse notation slightly to denote individual’s preferences
over the new set of commodities by the utility function ui(
L P
l=2
ˆ x1,l, ˆ x2,...,ˆ xL)=
ui(x1,x 2,...,x L)w h e r e
L P
l=2





L)w h e r e ˆ wi





1 and ˆ wi
l = wi
l,
l =2 ,...,L. The allocation (ˆ x1,2,...,ˆ x1,L, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xL) is feasible in the pseudo exchange




















l, l =2 ,...,L.R e -
mark that if the allocation (ˆ x1,2,..., ˆ x1,L, ˆ x2,...,ˆ xL) is feasible in the pseudo exchange
economy, the allocation (
L P
l=2
ˆ x1,l = x1,x 2,...,xL)w h e r eˆ xl = xl, l =2 ,...,L is also
feasible in the original excahnge economy. Moreover, if the allocation (x1,x 2,...,xL)




ˆ x1,l = x1 and ˆ xl = xl, l =2 ,...,L is feasible in the pseudo-exchange
economy. Therefore, the set of feasible utility proﬁles in the pseudo exchange
economy coincides with the set of feasible utility proﬁles in the original exchange
economy. Consider the allocation x in the original economy where u(x) À u(w).




ˆ x1,l = x1 and ˆ xl = xl, l =2 ,...,L. It follows that ui(
L P
l=2















L). Conversely, if ˆ x is an




ˆ x1,l = x1,x 2,...,x L)ˆ xl = xl, l =2 ,...,L in the original exchange
economy is such that u(x) À u(w). Next, we turn to speciﬁcation of the pseudo
market game. In the pseudomarket game, bids for commodity l are denoted in com-




L)s u c h
that 0 ≤ ˆ bi
l ≤ ˆ wi
1,l and 0 ≤ ˆ qi
l ≤ ˆ wi
l, l =2 ,...,L. The price formation rules and
allocation rules remain unchanged. At a strategy proﬁle where πl > 0, l =2 ,...,L,























Remark that an interior Nash equilibrium of the pseudo market game where
0 < ˆ bi
l < ˆ wi
1,l and 0 < ˆ qi
l < ˆ wi
l, l =2 ,...,L, i = 1,..I which yields allocation ˆ x is also
an interior Nash equilibrium of the original market game, with bi




l =2 ,...,L,w h i c hy i e l d sa l l o c a t i o nx where x =(
L P
l=2
ˆ x1,l = x1, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xL). To see
why, note that the ﬁrst-order conditions that characterise an interior Nash equilib-
r i u mi nt h ep s e u d om a r k e tg a m ea st h e yc o i n c i d ew i t ht h eﬁrst -order conditions
that characterise an interior Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it also follows that by
appropiately choosing ( ˆ wi
1,2,..., ˆ wi
1,L) for all i = 1,...,I, any interior Nash equilib-
rium of the original market game is also an interior Nash equilibrium of the pseudo
market game.
Lemma 1 Suppose w/ ∈ P in the original exchange economy. Then, there exists
¯ ε > 0 such that for all ε ≤ ¯ ε, there is some feasible allocation x with kx − wk < ε
and u(x) À u(w) such that x ∈ N(w) in the original market game.




l. Consider the set
¯ Z ≡
n
z ∈ <L : ui(z + wi) ≥ ui(wi), for all i ∈ I
o
.
As ui(.)i sc o n c a v e , ¯ Z is convex (intersection of convex upper contour sets). Re-
29mark that 0 is on the boundary of ¯ Z.18 It follows, by applying the support-
ing hyperplane theorem, there exists a vector ˜ π =( ˜ π1,..., ˜ πL) 6=0s u c ht h a t
˜ π¯ z ≥ 0f o ra l l¯ z ∈ ¯ Z. Consider the hyperplane
n
z ∈ <L :˜ πz =0
o
.R e m a r k t h a t
n
z ∈ <L :˜ πz =0
o
∩ ¯ Z = {0}. Next, note that ˜ πl > 0f o ra l ll = 1,...,L.19 As
the indiﬀerence sets of individuals through 0 are smooth, then the boundary of
the set ˜ Z ≡
n
z ∈ <L : ui(z + wi)=ui(wi), for all i ∈ I
o
is not diﬀerentiable at
0. Therefore, there exists a continuum of hyperplanes
n




z ∈ <L :˜ πz =0
o
∩ ¯ Z = {0},˜ πl > 0f o ra l ll = 1,...,L.W e c a n c h o o s e ˜ π À 0
such that for each i ∂xui(w) 6=˜ π,20 i.e., such that
n




z ∈ <L :˜ πz =0
o
6= φ. Without loss of generality, by an appropriate normaliza-
tion, we can set (˜ π1,..., ˜ πL)=( 1,π2,...,πL) À 0w h e r eπl = ˜ πl
˜ π1. In the remainder of
the proof we work with the vector π =( 1,π2,...,πL) À 0. As w/ ∈ P,t h e r ee x i s t s
a partition of the set of individuals into two non-empty sets I0 and I00 such that
























> (1,π2,...,πL). It folllows that there exists ¯ ²0 > 0




































1,l 6=0a n dˆ zi






,i= 1,...,I, l =2 ,...,L
18Note that even if players have diﬀerent endowments in the commodity space, in the excess
demand space they all have the same status quo at 0.









i for all i ∈ I and therefore, as the utility functions





i) for all i ∈ I, a contradiction.
20Recall that the utility functions are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and smooth at 0 by As-
sumption 1.
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,i= 1,...,I, l =2 ,...,L,










,i= 1,...,I, l =2 ,...,L.







































same sign. Therefore, ˆ Bl,−i > 0, l =2 ,...,L. Consider now the excess demand
vectors on the supporting hyperplane in Z(¯ ²0) and consider the associated set of
excess demand vectors in the pseudo exchange economy
ˆ Z(¯ ²0)=
n




l,l=2 ,...,L,i ∈ I,z ∈ Z(¯ ²0)
o
.
As w is not Pareto optimal and u(x) À u(w) in the original exchange economy, we
must have that πl −
∂xlui(wi)
∂x1ui(wi) 6= 0. Therefore,
lim
ˆ z→0,ˆ z∈ ˆ Z
ˆ Bl,−i =l i m
ˆ z→0,ˆ z∈ ˆ Z
ˆ Ql,−i =0 ,i = 1,...,I, l =2 ,...,L.












> 0, l =2 ,...,L.I tf o l l o w s
that for each i ∈ I,t h e r ee x i s t sˆ zi
1,l 6=0 ,ˆ zi






that 0 < ˆ Bl,−i < (I −1)ˆ w1,l,−i,0< ˆ Ql,−i < (I −1)ˆ wl,−i, and therefore 0 < ˆ bi
l < ˆ wi
1,l
and 0 < ˆ qi
l < ˆ wi







31for all i = 1,...,I, l =2 ,...,L as an interior Nash equilibrium allocation in the
pseudo market game. It follows that (
L P
l=2
ˆ x1,l = x1,x 2,...,xL), xl =ˆ xl, l =2 ,...,L,
is an interior Nash equilibrium allocation in the original market game such that
u(x) À u(w). In other words, there exists ¯ ² ≤ ¯ ²0 such that ∀² ∈ (0,¯ ²] ∃ x ∈ N(w),
kx − wk <² ,s u c ht h a tu(x) À u(w). QED.
By the preceeding lemma, there exists x0 ∈ N(w0)s u c ht h a tu¯ ı(w¯ ı) <u ¯ ı(w0¯ ı) <
u¯ ı(x0¯ ı) for the same individual¯ ı. As the utility of each individual is continuous, there
exists ˆ ε > 0 such that for all feasible allocations x with kx − wk < ˆ ε, u¯ ı(x¯ ı) <u ¯ ı(x0¯ ı).
But, then, by the preceeding lemma, there exists ¯ ε such that for all ε ≤ ¯ ε,t h e r e
exists x ∈ N(w) such that kx − wk < ε and u(x) À u(w). Let ε0 =m i n{ˆ ε, ¯ ε}.I t
immediately follows that there exists x ∈ N(w) such that kx − wk < ε0, u(x) À u(w)
and u¯ ı(x¯ ı) <u ¯ ı(x0¯ ı). QED.
8.2 Convergence with myopic retrading: an alternative proof
Let ˜ U be the set of strictly monotone, strictly concave, Cr, r ≥ LI, utility functions
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence on compacts (see Mas-Colell
(1985) for a deﬁnition). Let Ui be the subset of utility functions in ˜ U which have
the property that all u ∈ Ui are ﬁnite in the corresponding norm. Then, as Dubey
and Rogowski (1990) note, by Theorem 10.2 in Abraham and Robbins (1967), Ui is
an open subset of a Banach set. Let U = U1 × ... × UI.
Proposition 2’:C o n s i d e ru in the countable intersection of a collection of open and
dense subsets of U and w ∈ <LI
++,s u p p o s et h a tN(w)s a t i s ﬁes (P1)-(P2) whenever
w/ ∈ P.T h e n , f o r a n y w = y0 ∈ <LI
++, there exists a sequence of allocations {˜ yt},
t =0 ,1,...,˜ yt ∈ N(˜ yt−1)f o ra l lt ≥ 1,s u c ht h a t ,f o ra n yε > 0, there is a T>0
with d(u(˜ yt),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε for all t>T.
Proof. By Propositions 3 and 4, remark 5 and section 5.1 in Dubey and Ro-
gawski (1990), for every w ∈ <LI
++, there is an open and dense subset of U so that
for each ¯ u in this subset, each interior Nash equilibrium proﬁle of strategies can be
represented as the transverse intersection of an appropriately chosen map, η∗,w i t h
an appropriately chosen manifold N∗ (see page 295, Dubey and Rogowski (1990)).
As the domain of η∗ is compact, by the openness of transversal intersections (page
3243, Mas-Colell (1985)), it follows that there is an ε > 0s u c ht h a tf o ra l lw0 with
kw0 − wk < ε,f o re a c h¯ u in the open and dense subset of U associated with w,
each interior Nash equilibrium proﬁle of strategies can be represented as the trans-
verse intersection of an appropriately chosen map, η∗, with an appropriately chosen
manifold N∗. Consider a countable set of allocations, contained in <LI
++,w h i c hi s
dense in F. Such a set exists. Let Fk denote the projection of F onto the k-th
coordinate of <LI
++. Remark that the set of rational numbers in Fk is a dense subset
of Fk.T a k e t h e LI product of the subset of rational numbers contained in each
Fk.D e n o t e t h i s s e t b y Υ.T h e n , Υ is a countable set which is dense in F.F o r
each allocation in w ∈ Υ, there exists an open and dense subset of U such that
(a) each interior Nash equilibrium proﬁle of strategies can be represented as the
transverse intersection of an appropriately chosen map, η∗,w i t ha na p p r o p r i a t e l y
chosen manifold N∗ and (b) there is an ε > 0 such that for all w0 with kw0 − wk < ε,
for each ¯ u in the open and dense subset of U associated with w, each interior Nash
equilibrium proﬁle of strategies can be represented as the transverse intersection
of an appropriately chosen map, η∗, with an appropriately chosen manifold N∗.
It follows that by taking the countable intersection of the open and dense subsets
of U corresponding to some w ∈ Υ, we obtain, by the Baire property (page 10,
Mas-Colell (1985)), a non-empty dense subset of U such that each u in this set
and every y ∈ F ∩ <LI
++, each interior Nash equilibrium proﬁle of strategies can be
represented as the transverse intersection of an appropriately chosen map, η∗,w i t h
an appropriately chosen manifold N∗ and further, η∗ is also transverse to every
submanifold of N∗: therefore, η∗ satisﬁes the deﬁnition of transverse stability. Fix
u in this dense subset of U.L e tw/ ∈ P. Consider the sequence of sets N1,...,Nt,...,
with y0 = w,a n dNt = {x : x ∈ N(y),f o rs o m ey∈ Nt−1}, t = 1,...,w i t h
the associated sequence of sets u(N1),...,u(Nt),... in utility space <I.B y ( P2),
we can extract a sequence ˜ ut, t =0 ,1,... such that ˜ ut ∈ u(Nt)a n d˜ ut+1 > ˜ ut,
at each t,w i t hy0,....,yt,.... the associated sequence of allocations. Note that for
each i ∈ I, the sequence ˜ ui
t, t =0 ,1,... is bounded above, as the utility of each
individual is continuous and the set of feasible allocations is compact. Let ¯ ui de-
note the supremum of the sequence ˜ ui
t, t =0 ,1,.... As every increasing sequence
33converges to the supremum, it follows that the sequence ˜ ut, t =0 ,1,...,c o n v e r g e s
to ¯ u =( ¯ u1,..., ¯ uI), the component-wise supremum of ˜ ut =( ˜ u1
t,...,˜ uI
t), t =0 ,1,....
Moreover, by passing to subsequence if necessary, without loss of generality, we may
assume that the associated sequence of allocations yt,t=0 ,1,...converges to some
allocation ¯ y such that u(¯ y)=¯ u. By considering every sequence of utilities and the
corresponding sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading which satisfy
(P2), we obtain a set of allocations ¯ Y which consists of the limit allocations of
each sequence of allocations yt,t=0 ,1,....W eh a v et os h o wt h a tf o re v e r yε > 0,
there is some ¯ y ∈ ¯ Y such that d(u(¯ y),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε. Then, for every ε > 0
t h e r ew i l lb es o m eT>0 and some sequence of allocations generated by myopic
retrading yt,t=0 ,1,...which converges to ¯ y such that (a) d(u(¯ y),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε
2
and (b) for all t>T , d(u(yt),u(P ∩ IR)) < ε. Suppose to the contrary, that
miny∈cl.(¯ Y ) d(u(y),u(P ∩ IR)) > 0w i t h¯ y0 ∈ argminy∈cl.(¯ Y ) d(u(y),u(P ∩ IR)cl(¯ Y ).
Then, by (P2), there exists an allocation ˆ y ∈ N(¯ y0)a n di ∈ I such that ui(ˆ y) >
ui(¯ y0i). It follows that there exists ε > 0 such that for all ky − ¯ y0k < ˜ ε,t h e r ee x -
ists ˜ y ∈ N(y)s u c ht h a tui(˜ yi) >u i(¯ y0i). Moreover, for every ε > 0, there is some
¯ y ∈ ¯ Y such that d(u(¯ y),u(¯ y0)). Therefore, for every ε > 0, there exists a sequence
of allocations y0
t,t=0 ,1,...generated by myopic retrading so that there is a ˜ T such
that for all t>˜ T, ky0
t − ¯ y0k < ˜ ε,t h e r ee x i s t sy00
t ∈ N(y0
t), ui(y00i
t ) >u i(¯ y0i). Consider
the sequence y00
0,....,y00
t ,.... where for t ≤ ˜ T,, y00
t = y0




t ) >u i(¯ y0i)a n df o rt>˜ T + 1, y00
t ∈ N(y00
t−1)a n dui(y00i
t ) >u i(y00i
t−1).
Let ˜ u00
t, t =0 ,1,... be the associated sequence of allocations. Remark that ¯ u0 is
no longer the component-wise supremum of ˜ u00
t, t =0 ,1,.... Therefore, the se-
quence ˜ u00
t, t =0 ,1,... must converge to ¯ u00 =( ¯ u001,...,¯ u00I), the component-wise
supremum of ˜ u00
t =( ˜ u00
t,..., ˜ u00I
t ), t =0 ,1,... and the associated sequence of allo-
cations y00
0,....,y00
t ,.... must converge to some ¯ y00 such that u(¯ y00)=¯ u00 such that
d(¯ u00,u(P ∩ IR)) <d (u(¯ y0),u(P ∩ IR)), a contradiction. QED.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 6
We construct a strategy proﬁle σ that has the following phases:
Phase (1): Players choose ˜ st at each t that supports the sequence of allocations
34generated by myopic (interior) Nash retrading which converges to the Pareto frontier
along the equilibrium path of play namely, {˜ yt}, t =0 ,1,.... Such a sequence of
allocations exists by Propisition 2 and is, by construction, retrade-proof. be the
corresponding sequence of allocations. At each time t,i ft h eh i s t o r yo fp l a yi sa si n
phase(1), continue choosing ˜ st.
Phase (2): In Phase (2), some player i(1) has deviated from the sequence
of bids and oﬀers in Phase (1). Consider a deviation from Phase (1)a ts o m e




t(1).A s˜ st(1) is a myopic (interior) Nash
equilibrium at t(1), ui(1)(xi(1)(s
0i(1)





t(1) , ˜ s−i(1),t(1)), j = 1,...,I. Let ˜ y
(2)
t(1) =( ˜ y(2),j : j ∈ I). Remark that ˜ y
(2)
t(1) À 0
as at t(1)a l lt r a d e r si 6= i(1) are choosing strictly positive bids and oﬀers. There-









t(1), t = t(1),t(1)+1,...,T,s u c ht h a t( i )˜ y
(2)
t ∈ N(˜ y
(2)
t−1)f o ra l lt>t (1), (ii)
ui(1)(˜ y
(2),i(1)






for all t ≥ t(1). Fix the sequence of allocations gener-








Phase (K): Consider a deviation from Phase (K-1)a ts o m et(K −1) >t (K −2)




t(K−1).A s˜ st(K) is a myopic
(interior) Nash equilibrium at t(K−1), ui(K−1)(xi(K−1)(s
0i(K−1)
t(K−1) , ˜ s−i(K−1),t(K−1))) <




t(K−1) , ˜ s−i(K),t(K−1)), j = 1,...,I.
Let ˜ y
(K)
t(K−1) =( ˜ y
(K),j
t(K−1) : j ∈ I). Remark that ˜ y
(K)
t(K−1) À 0a sa tt(K − 1)a l l
traders i 6= i(K − 1) are choosing strictly positive bids and oﬀers. Therefore, by






starting from ˜ y
(K)
t(K−1),
t = t(K − 1),t(K − 1)+1,...,T,s u c ht h a t( i )˜ y
(K)
t ∈ N(˜ y
(K)
t−1)f o ra l lt>t (K − 1),
(ii) ui(K−1)(˜ y
(K),i(K−1)






for all t ≥ t(K − 1). Fix the sequence








Phase (T): In Phase (T), some player i(T −1) has deviated from the sequence of
bids and oﬀers in Phase (T-1). Consider a deviation from Phase (T-1)a tT − 1 by




T−1 .A s˜ sT−1 is a myopic (interior) Nash equi-
librium at T − 1, ui(T−1)(xi(T−1)(s
0i(T−1)





T−1 , ˜ s−i(T−1),T−1), j = 1,...,I. Let ˜ y
(T)
T−1 =( ˜ y
(T),j
T−1 : j ∈ I). Re-
mark that ˜ y
(T)
T−1 À 0a sa tT − 1 all traders i 6= i(T − 1)a r ec h o o s i n ga r ec h o o s i n g
strictly positive bids and oﬀers. Therefore, by proposition 1, there exists an allo-
cation ˜ y
(T)
t starting from ˜ y
(T)
T−1, t = T − 1,T,s u c ht h a t( i )˜ y
(T)












Remark that the sequence of bids and oﬀe r sc h o s e na te a c hp h a s eo ft h es t r a t e g y
proﬁle σ will depend on the identity of the deviator from the path of play speciﬁed
in the preceeding phase. The existence of such a strategy proﬁle σ is guaranteed by
Proposition 1. Consider the sequence of allocations in phase(1) {˜ yt}, t =0 ,1,...,T.
In proposition 5, we have already shown that for every ε > 0, there is a T and
δ(1) such that (i) d(u(˜ yT),u(P)) < ε for all δ ∈ [δ(1),1], T ≥ T and (ii) no player
i will have a unilateral incentive to stop trading at some t<T(iii) {˜ yt}, t =
0,1,...,T is retrade proof. By a simillar argument, it also follows that for each
phase(K), K>1,K <T the sequence of allocations ˜ y0,..., ˜ yt(1)−1,˜ y
(2)









T there is a δ(K)s u c ht h a t( i )n op l a y e ri will have a
unilateral incentive to stop trading at some t<T(iii) the sequence of allocations
˜ y0,..., ˜ yt(1)−1,˜ y
(2)








T is retrade proof. Fix
δ =m i n K {δ(1),...,δ(K),...,δ(T)}.R e m a r k t h a t δ < 1. It follows that for all δ,
δ < δ < 1, σ satisﬁes the unimprovability by one-shot deviations and is, therefore,
subgame perfect. be the corresponding sequence of allocations. But, then, for every
ε > 0, there is a T and δ and y ∈ ˜ XR(δ,w,T) such that d(u(y),u(P)) < ε for all
δ ∈ [δ,1], T ≥ T. QED.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 8
We show that if y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T), then y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ00,w,T). In order to show this,
the following lemma comes handy. Consider the strategy proﬁle ˆ σ(δ0,y0)w h i c hi s
identical to a SPE σ(δ0,y 0) on the equilibrium path but diﬀers oﬀ the equilibrium
path in that, after any deviation from the equilibrium path of play at some time
t<T(σ(δ0,y0)), bi
t0 = qi
t0 = 0, for all t0 >t .L e tˆ Σ denote the corresponding set of
strategies.
36Lemma 2 For any T<∞, for all δ ∈ [0,1], y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T) if and only if there is
a ˆ σ(δ0,y0) ∈ ˆ Σ that supports y0.
Proof. When δ = 0, all traders stop trading at t = 0, implying that x0 ∈ N(w). It
follows that any SPE strategy proﬁle must be an element of ˆ Σ.S u p p o s eδ ∈ (0,1].
If there is a ˆ σ(δ0,y0) ∈ ˆ Σ that supports y0,b yd e ﬁnition y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T). Next,
suppose that σ(δ0,y0)i saS P Es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that yields y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T). Then,
ˆ σ(δ0,y0) is also a SPE strategy that yields y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T). By construction, observe
that no player has an incentive to deviate after T(σ(δ0,y0)) + 1 or after observing
a deviation from the equilibrium path of play. Therefore, suppose player i deviates
at t choosing some action s0i
t .A s bi
¯ t = qi
¯ t =0 ,i ∈ I,f o ra l l¯ t>t ,d e n o t ei’s





t ,s −i,t(σ(δ0,y0))) be the resulting allocation for i when he chooses s0i
t
while all other players choose according to ˆ σ(δ0,y0). Observe that as σ(δ0,y0)i s
itself a SPE, it must be the case that i’s maximum payoﬀ from deviating from
the equilibrium path of play under the strategy proﬁle σ(δ0,y 0)c a n n o tb el e s st h a n
u
d,i
t (δ0). Therefore, if player i has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium path
of play under σ(δ0,y0), she cannot have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium
path of play under ˆ σ(δ0,y 0). QED.
Given Lemma 2, we can assume w.l.o.g that any y0 ∈ ˜ X(δ0,w,T)i ss u p p o r t e db y
aS P Ep r o ﬁle ˆ σ(δ0,y0). We need to show that ˜ σ(δ0,y0)r e m a i n saS P Es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle
when δ = δ00.F o re a c hi,l e t˜ Ti denote the ﬁnal period when si
t(˜ σ(δ0,y0)) 6=0 .T h e n
we must have, at each t ≤ ˜ Ti, ui(xi(st(˜ σ(δ0,y0))) ≤ (δ0)
˜ Ti−tui(xi(s ˜ Ti(˜ σ(δ0,y0))) and
for all t0 >t , t0 ≤ ˜ Ti, ui(xi(s0
i,t,s −i,t(˜ σ(δ0,y0))) ≤ (δ0)t0−tui(xi(st0(˜ σ(δ0,y0))). Finally,
note that as δ00 > δ0, the above inequalities continue to hold when δ0 is replaced by
δ00. QED.
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